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1. Introduction
Following a more general tradition, past economic studies of migra-
tion did not distinguish between personal and family decisions.1 With the
emergenceofdetailed household panel data and of modern family economics,
suchinaccuryis no longer admissible. This paper joins a few very recent
attempts to analyze migrationin the awarenessof the family context.2 In
contrast to most of them, my focus is exclusively on the family context. The
paper defines family ties relevant to migration decisions and explains their
effects on the probability ofmigration, on consequent changes in employ—
meritandearningsof family members, as well as onfamily integrityitself.
Hopefully, the paper provides material for a missing chapter on familyeconomics
as well as an addition to the economics oflabor supply arid of human capital
formation.
Theanalysis startsfrom anexplicit recognitionthat net familygain
rather than net personal gain (of the "head"?) motivates migration of house—
holds. Of course,this distinction disappears whenthe (independent) house-
hold consists of a single person. In a familyconsistingof one member(i1)
1Perhapsone reason is that the distinction between person and. family
isviewed as a sociological rather thaneconomicissue. Indeed, sociological
researchon migration considers the family quite explicitlyasa collection
ofindividuals (cf. Long, 1972, l971, 1975). The most recent survey of the
economic literature (Greenwood, 1975) does not even mention the family context
of migration.
2DaVanzo (19714, 1976), Kaluzny (1975), Polachek andHorvath (1976),
Sandell(1975). With the exception of DaVanzo (19714), these papers' were
not available to meprior to the first draft in 1975. The current version
benefittedfrom the new findings andcontainsreferences to them.-2—
mobilitytakesplacewhen =B.—C.>0,whereG. is the net realincome
gainfrommigration, B. returns and C. costs, all appropriately discounted.
Whentwoor more members arepresentin the family and the migration decision
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Presumably,families tend to belessmobile than persons unencumbered
byspouseandchildren.The economic basis for this phenomenon, or at least
theory, is that innuclearfamilies returns from migration (ZR.) increase
less thancosts (Ec.) as Iincreases with the presence of spouse andchildren.
Demographic research (Long, 1975) confirms the inhibiting effect of i >1
andespeciallyof the presence of children, with somewhat weaker effects of
theirnumbers on family migration. One source of locational specificity in
the presence of children is their schooling. Locational choices of the family
areinfluenced by accessto schools which the familyprefersand can afford.
Oncechildren areplaced at such schools the costs of geographic mobility are
augmented. Long's research (1975) does, indeed, show that it is not so much
family size (when i >2),butthe presence of school—age children that in-
hibits family migration. By the same token, the prospective schooling of
children may well be a factor accelerating mobility of the family when the
childrenarestill ofpre—school age.
In order to focus on the prototype of the economic problems arising
when i>1,Iabstract from the presence of children in the analytical model.
Init I consideronly two streams of costs andreturns,sothatGf =G1
+G2 ,
wherethe subscripts refer to husband and wife. Costs andreturnsshould be
understood to include both monetory andnonnionetarycomponents, even ifthe
latter appear to be slighted because they aremoredifficult to identify.
Thepresenceof children is not dismissed in the empirical analysis.—3—
2. Moving as a Fami]j
To simplify the exposition, let us first aggregate all potential des-
tinations into one. Now, in order for the family to move G >0.If
and havethe same sign, marital status does not affect the behavior of
husband andwife.Differences arise only when the signs ofand G2 differ.
Inthat case Gf >0means that one spouse moves along with the other even
thouihis (orher) "private" calculus1dictatesstaying. The net loss of
the "tied" mover mustbesmaller thanthe net gain of the other spouse to
resultin a net familygain from moving.Conversely, ifthesigns differ
andGf <0,onemember of the couple would have moved, were it not for the
potential loss the other would suffer which exceeds the gain of the would—be—
mover.Theresult is one "tied" stayer. Inboth cases the "tied" partner
is one whose absolute value of loss (gain) is less than the absolute value
of gain (loss) of the other partner.5
Theincidence of "tied" movers andstayers can beseen in this simple
example: Let the average probability of a geographic move of adult men or
women,when separate, be about 16percent over the relevant period. Ifthe
sign of is independent (in probability) of the sign of G2, only 2.56per-
centof all families will migrate without conflicting "private" incentives,
"private" optimum Is the maximalpotentialpersonal gain in the
absence of family ties,to be distinguished from the actual personal gain
or loss, given the familydecision.
5Note the implicit simplifying assumptionthatthe family's perceived
gain from migration (Gf) is the unweighted sumof the separate gains (Gj.+
G2)frczn migrationto a place. If "male chauvinism" the wife's "G"
receives alesser weight in family decisions. This would not basically affect
our model,thoughit may affect the empirical magnitudes. Even without "male
chauvinism", a dollar of wife's current gain receives less weight than a
dollar of husband's current gain, because what matters is the present value
of the gain, and the Ga are defined as present value.—
and 70.56percent of families willstay withoutconflict. In the remaining
26.88 percent of all families, one member is moving or staying contrary to
his "private" calculus of gains and losses. The allocation of these "tied
persons" among movers and stayers cannot be gauged in this illustration.
However,Table 1provides an answer if we are willing to assume that and
arepb.ired randomly from distributions that are identical andnormal.In
this case 7.5percent of the familiesmove6 and 2/3 of them (7.5 —2.56=5%)
contain "tied movers", while 92.5 percent stay with about one quarter of them
(92.5 —70.5622%) containing "tied stayers". The major point of this
exampleis the dramatic drop of the migration rate from 16% to 7.5% merely
by the random pairing of spouses. As will be shown, the irthibiting effect
of marital status is reduced, but not eliminated when the special assump-
tions of this illustration arerelaxed. Except that, at the opposite extreme,
if thegains (or losses) of men always dominated the losses (or gains) of
women, or ifthepairs of gains were perfectly positively correlated, the
proportion ofmen(and thereforeof women) migrating would be the same whether
theyare married or not.
To consider the matter ingreatergenerality, drop the assumption of
independence between the signs ofand
G2andsimplyassume a bivariate
distribution ofand G2, with means and variancesl' °2'2'andcor-
relation p12. Now, the probability of migration of persons, or the "private"
probability of each spouse is P(G. >0),thearea in the distribution of
G. to the right of G. =0,inFigure 1. The size of this area is inversely
related to the standardized value of G =0,namely
figure appears in Table 1(b)onthe assumption that G1andG2
areuncorrelated (s= 0)andequal, on average (k =1).—5—
TABLE1
(a)Ratio ()2 to (cv)2
0 1/1 1/2 3/14 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1/2121/257/9 37/149 3/14
0 117/255/925/1491/2
—1/2 113/251/3 13/149 1/14
—1 3. 3/14 1/9 1/149 0
(b) P(Gf >0),whenP(G. >a) 16%
...,
0 i/14 1/2 3/14 1
1 i6.o16.0 16.016.016.0
1/216.0 13.813.212.912.7
0 16.0 11.3 8.3 8.1 7.5
—1/216.0 8.2 14.0 2.8 2.3
—1 i6.o 14.8 0.1 0.0 0.0—6-
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whereCVI is the coefficient of variation in the distribution.




.Thisensures that the "private't
migration probabilities areidenticalfor each sex. Yet the probability of








=Vi + 2pk+ =Cv\/÷ (i)
U1 1+k 1Vl+2k+k2
Itis clear fr (1) that CVf=
CV1wheneither p =+1ork=0
In other words, when the two gains (or losses) are perfectly correlated or
when one spouse's gain (or loss) is negligible, and is therefore always dominated





is the maximal valueof CVf since
themaximumvalueof the square root expression is unity. In general there
is a deterrent effect of marital status which is stronger the lesser (or the
more negative) the correlation of and For p <1,theminimum
value of CVf is reached when k =1
Thetop—most panel of Table 1 showsthe reduction in CVf compared
toCVI, for several values of p and k. In the bottom—hand panel of Table 1-8-
wecangetsome notion of the orders of magnitude in the reduction of the
familymigrationprobabilities as parameter p is decreased andkincreased.
A simple but informative simulation procedure is to assumenormald.istribu-
tions in Figure 1 andtakea period for which P(G. >0)=i6percent
Then since Z. =1,CV.=1andcumulativeprobabilities for Z =
1 1 f
CVI.
canbeinspected in a normalprobabilitytable. These arelistedin the
bottompart of Table 1 for values of k for 0 <k<1and. of p, for
—lp+l
Itappears from the table that an equalizationofwork experience of
men and women, and presumably a consequent equalization of the distribution
of gains from migration (that is, an increase of k toward 1) brings about a
reduction in family propensities to migrate, provided p ,thecorrelation
amonggains from migration ofspouses, remains unchanged. The deterrent
effectof a higher k is stronger at lower correlation levels; for given levels
of k the stronger the correlation the less the deterrent effect of marriage
on migration.
It is also easy to see that the higher the correlation p, the smaller
is the incidence of tied spouses: their "public" (family) decisionsare
largelyconsistent with their "private" gains from migration. At the same
time, k ——theratio of women's to men's gains ——affectsthe distribution,
rather than the incidence of tied partners among movers and stayers: The
closer women's gains to men's (k +1),the fewer the number of tied movers,
but the larger the number of tied starers (of both sexes), since the total
numberofmovers is smaller. With low levels of Ic, there is little deterrence
tomigration and most of the migrating families contain "tied" women. Note,
however, that the seriousness of the conflicts between G and. G. increases f 1—9—
with k —amatter which potentially affects family stability when migration
opportunities arise. This matter is discussed in section 4below.
Since "tied" persons in the family are those whose gains from migra-
tion are (in absolute value) dominated by gains (or losses) of the spouse,
there are reasons to believe that wives are more likely than husbands to be
the dominated ("tied") partners. The assumption that k <1is especially
plausible for the labor market components of G.: On the return side larger
gains (or losses) are likely to accrue to persons with greater market earning
power. On the cost side, foregone earnings are also higherfor suchpersons.
Moreover,the return from migration is likely to be smaller for persons whose
labor force participation is discontinuous. Thus, the absolute value of G
is larger for husbands than for wives. Indeed, within the family, higher
market earning powers of husbands induce a lesser market participation, lower
market earnings, and a diminished migration payoff for the wife. The lesser
net payoff to wives may also result from a larger non—market component in
opportunity costs of migration acquired in non—market activity.
Consequently, wives are more likely to be tied movers in migrating
families while husbands, ifthey are tied at all, aremorelikely to be tied
stayers than tied movers. This is most likely to happen when the wives con-
tribution to familyincome derives from a job. Of course,the larger the
contribution andthestronger job attachment, the greater the deterrent effect
on familymobility.
If husbands'gains(or losses) frommigrationusually exceed the losses
(or gains) of the wife (k <i),ananalysis which disregards familystatus
will not err much in explaining migration behavior of men, especially if
their wives arenotemployed, butwill be quite wrong inanalyzing the behavior—10—
of women, especially of married women who migrate. In our example, as many
as two—thirds of the women movers might move for family reasons only, while
at most one—quarter of the women stayers are "tied".
Judging by Table 1, and assuming that the distribution of gains from
mobility are related to distributions of wages expected over longer periods
of time, we may guess at current U.S. levels of k at a little over one—quarter:
.1 is the ratio of working wives to husbands' annual earnings,6 and since
laborforce participation of wives is about .5, the ratio for all families
is .2. p would be .5ifthe correlation between the education of spouses
is used as a guide, and .3 or less judging by the correlation of wages in
couples with working wives. If so, marital status (k —.25,p .3) may
reduce migration propensities of all families by as much as 20 percent. P
Presence of working wives (k =., p=.3)should reduce it by as much as
,Ct7
As alreadynoted,trends toward equalization of labor market experiences
of men and women (k increasing towardi)cause reductions in migration pro-
pensities in stable families. But, we will be shown, they also create greater
instability. Trends in p and their effects are notobvious.8 Even if marital endogazny
(similarity of traits) were to increase, the effects on migration would not
be clear, unless endogamy were to extend to most detailed occupational charac-
teristics of spouses.
6Theestimate is .37 if l97 figures areused (Table39 in CPS, P—60,
No. 101). I am grateful to Larry Long for the estimate and the references.
Tlnterestingly, the BI report on migration in 1962—1963 (Special Labor
Force Report No. 14) states that migration of married men (wife present) was
almost one—third less than that of other men, at ages 18 to 6.
8The correlation between husband's earnings andwives'labor force
participation hasbeenchanging secularly from negative to positive, at least
below median earnings of husbands (see Manpower Report of the President, 1975,
p. 59). This maysuggestan upward trend in p.—11—
At anr rate, inferences about the effects of p should be qualified
due to its necessarily restricted definition in Table 1: It represents a
correlation of gains from outmigration ,sincea single (aggregated) destina-
tion was assumed. Ifpayoffsbeckon in different destinations, p loses its
meaning altogether, and the family migration problem is magnified.
3. Several Destinations
Sincemore than one destination is generally open to potential migrants,
G. should be defined as the maximumGover all possibledestinations. Then
therelevant personal G1max andG2maxmayrefer to different destinations,
sayD1 andD2, and a conflict arises even when G1and are both posi-
tive. For the family decision,however, Gf = + mustbe maximized,
and this may result in the family notmoving, or moving to D1, D2, oreven
D3
whereneither of the personal gains is maximized but the sum of both is
the greatest.
Thus in families who migrate, even the "dominating" partner has a gain
max at destination, which is on average smallerthan ,theoptimal gain
he would have got in a differentdestination. If both gains arepositive,
neither is as large as itwouldhave been ifeachof the partners went to his
(her) optimal destination. In this sense, both spouses are "tied" to some
degree, although the partner whose gain is larger will tend to be closer to
his optimum. The previous conclusion that the "dominated" partner loses by
migration need no longer be true: Both lose relative to their "private"
potential, and the "dominated" spouse loses more,9 but both may gain, even
in a "private" sense (they always gain as a family) relative to origin.
9Fora focus onthis matter see R.H. Frank (1976).—12—
The divergence of the two G. among destinations is most likely to arise
when both aremotivatedby job opportunities. For the spouse that is not
working, attachment to origin is probably a more important factor affecting
migration decisions than differential pull of various destinations. For
working couples the compromise involved in finding a destination which maxi-
mized family gains at the expense of the potential advancement of each worker
creates more ties: Now both rather than one spouse are "tied" in migration.
As shown in the next section, the larger magnitude of ties,1P the greater the
potential for family breakup caused by migration opportunities.
We may conjecture that to the extent that both G are motivated by job
opportunities, the dissimilarity in locational specificities of spouses that
max
gives rise to G. <G. might be reduced by a tendency for such families
to locate in large, diversified labor markets. Thus, itmaywell be that
growingjob motivation of wives will weaken the tendency toward far—flung
suburbanization, not only because of the negative effects ofwageprospects
on fertility, but also because of a need for greater proximity to large, di-
versified labormarkets.
The expectation of becoming a tied spouse, which characterized most
women until very recently, may have had some influence on women's initial
occupational choices. The preference for occupations which aremosteasily
transferable geographically may have contributed in part to the concentra-
tion of women in such traditional occupations as teaching, nursing, and secre-
tarial work.11
10Note the more general definition of a "tie": Tied movers arenot
only those with negative gains. Ties are defined and measured bidiscrepancies
between actual and maximum potential private gains. Presence aswellas
degree of "tiedness" arerelevant, asshownin section 1,below.
11 . . Cf.Long (19714) for this point of view.—13—
Butas the dramatic recent increases in familyinstabilityget embed-
dedin expectations, the incentives for suchprioradjustments willbere-
duced. More immediately, as shown in the next section, the growingrisk
of marital instability reduces incentives of spouses to compromise locationally.
Consequently, in a classic case of self—fulfilling expectations, differential
migration incentives amplify marital instability, once it is anticipated.
l. Migration andFamilyStability
Therelation between marital status and migration is a two—way street
not only under uncertainty, as will be shown. As weinquireabout the effects
of locational decisions on marital status, the criterion Gf = +> 0
remainsa necessary, but no longer a sufficient condition for migration as
a family.







,where is the potential optimal
"private" gain, while G. is the individual gain (or loss) from optimal family




.Tis nothing elsebut a measure of tne negative
"private"externality imposed by familymigration.
Aswill be shown, the family internalizes this externality so long as
<M,whereM= M1+
M2,thefamily gain from marriage. When ITt> M,
thefamily cannot assimilatethe externality. Itdissolves; one spouse moves,
theother stays. M.is the gain from marriage ——thedifference between full
wealthwhen married and fullwealthwhen single. A necessary andsufficient
conditionfor a marriage to dissolve is when familywealthisexpected to be
less than the sum of each partner's wealth when they are separated (Becker,




whereG1 and may refer to different destinations (including origin
as one of them).
The meaning of inequality (2) is seen more easily when we revert to the












This condition holds regardless of the family's decision whether to move or
not. In each case the"injured" party mayfindit to its benefit to break
away rather thantoadhere to the "majority" rule.
Considerfirst the condition Gf >0.Thiscondition is not sufficient




partner1 is better off moving andcouldnot be bribed to stay even if he got
allof 2 from 2. But might he notbribe 2 to move with him andbe still
better off? No, since giving all of M1 to 2 would not suffice, according to
(2a).In this case 1is better off moving alone, while 2 is better off staying
alone.
When Gf <0,becauseG2 >0,but <0and 1G11
> , sothe
family would be expected to stay if it did not dissolve, it will dissolve under
thesame condition (2a). It is important to keep in mind that whether the
familymovesor stays, the left side of inequality (2) represents gains from
marriageCM1 +M2)and frommigration (G1 +G2)when
moving and zero when
staying. The right hand side represents migration gains (zero for stayers)—15—
for separated partners. Now, with M1 +M2
<, partner2 leaves and cannot
be bribed by partner 1 to stay, nor will partner 2 induce 1 to come along,
as this would make 2 even worse off than if he (or she) stayed.
To repeat, in the single destination case, family breakup occurs as
soon as the gain (or loss) of the dominated ("tied") partner exceeds the total
family gain from marriage. In the general case, breakup occurs when the sum
of ties T exceeds the sum of gains from marriage M. Under these conditions,
the gains from migration lead each of the spouses to follow their "private"
opportunities separately.
The conditions (2a) for breakup due to migration decisions are rather
stringent.The smaller of the gain (G1) or loss (G2) (in absolute value)
from migration must exceed the sum of the gains from marriage. The more general
condition (2), with more than one destination, makes marital breakup more
probable, as the right side of inequality (2) must exceed that in (2a). Since
multi—destination possibilities aremoreplausible for two—earner families,
migration—causedbreak—ups are alsomore likely in such families. This is
especiallytrue ifthe prospective stability of marriage is uncertain, regard-
less of location. If p is the life—time probability of preserving the marriage,
the dissolution contingent on migrationdecisions becomes more plausible when
either M or p are small, since !TI >pMexpected gains from marriage is more
likely the smaller each. Since (M1 +M2)as well as p are likely to grow11
with the duration of marriage andthepresence of children, dissolutions due
tomigration would decline with duration of marriage and are lesslikely when
childrenareat home, apart from the decline of the frequency of migration.
While single (never married, or separated a long time ago) persons
reside in a locational equilibrium, this is not true of the "private" as
distinguished from the family equilibrium of married people. One or both
11The mechanism may be selectivity as well as growth.of the partners may be foregoing a private gain or incurring a private loss
from migration as a trade—off against the gain from marriage. Marital dis-
solutionrestores or creates new "private" incentives, thereby causing, for
a time, greater mobility of separated men and women than of those not only
married,but also of those nevermarried. With the passageof time, the dif-
ferences between never married,and separated former spouses tends to disappear.
In the case of the newly remarried, as in the case of newly married
people, a change in migration equilibrium will also result in increased initial
migration, but with the passage of time the differences from the behavior of
those married once for a longer time disappears. Thus marital instability,
whatever its source, creates "disequilibrium" migration incentives, while the
differential migration incentives of spouses creates marital instability.
The theoretical discussion and the following empirical evidence in
this paper indicate the way in which the initial (and expected) comparative
advantages of family members in market and household activities tend to be
reinforcedby familylabor mobility decisions. The adverse effects on the
labormarket experience of some married women maybeseen as "social oppres-
sion"from a "private" point of view. Such a view, however, fails to note
that the behavior we analyzed is a product of family welfare maximization.
This is pareto—optimal since "private" market losses can beinternalized by
thefamily, that is compensated by a redistribution of gains. However, when
thesunof separate real incomes exceeds family real income, the optimal adjust-
ment is family dissolution, a growing phenomenon which is in part traceable
to the changing division of labor among the sexes.—17—
PARTII.IMPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS
The following examples provide clear empirical illustrations of the
concepts of "tied" spouses and of the distinctions between personal and family
gain in migration analysis:
(1) A BLSsurvey of persons unemployed inApril 1962,12 the
incidence andattitudesof tied spouses: the unemployed were asked
whether they would accept a job in another area comparable to the
one they lost. A positive answer wasgivenby 30% of the married
men, 21% of the single women, andonly 8% ofthe married women.
Most people who said "no" cited family, home,and. relatives as
reasonsfor the reluctance to move. However, one quarter of the
women singledout their husbands'jobin the present areaas
themajor deterrentfactor, while only 3% ofthe husbands mentioned
their wife's job as such a factor. If this finding for the un-
employed can be generalized to the entire population, 30% of
families would move and30%—8%=22%or two—thirds of the
wives of moving families wouldbe "tied movers", while 25% out
of 70% of wives in families of stayers declared themselves to be
"tied stayers". (Surprisingly, these figures are rather close
to the numbers produced in the hypothetical example on p.4 ).
(2)The importance of the distinction between personal and family gains
from migration wasfirstshown in a study by Julie DaVanzo (1972).
Using 1960 Censusdataaggregated into nine Census divisions the
studyestimated gross migration flows of men and women as functions
of"prospective" personal family gains. It was suggested in our
discussion that analysts looking at personal gains aremostlikely
R.Stein,"Work History, Attitudes, andIncomeof the Unemployed,"
MonthlyLabor Review, Dec. 1963.—18—
tomisinterpret the behavior of women. The study by DaVanzo shows
that men'sgains explain migration of men in regressions with
R2 3l .Whenfamilygainis substituted, the R2 increases
to .39. Thefor female migration functions using their own
gain wasonly.21. It increases to .32 when men's gains are
substitutedin the same regressions, andto.141 when familygains
are used.
1. Marital Status
If family tiesdeter migration, as ourdiscussion suggests, then husband.-
wife families should migrate less frequently than persons without spouses.
An excellent demographic study by Larry H. Long (19714) documents this difference
very clearly with data on annual migration rates reportedin the U.S. Census
Current Population Surveys and averaged over a six—year period (1966—1971).
T&ole 1, borrowed from Long's study, shows that in each age group annual migra-
tion rates (col's 2 and 3)ofhusband and wife families in which the husband
was 25 —614yearsold were less than rates of men without wives (single, widowed,
separated, and divorced).
The behavior of the youngest families (husband's age less than 25)
constitutes an exception, which can be explained by the concept of changes in
locational equilibrium. Life—cycle events such as completion of schooling,
entry into the labor force, family formation, or dissolutioncreate new in-
centives and opportunities for migration. Conversely, people also migrate
tostart a career and. to marry. Since the youngest married couples are,
practically by definition, most recently married, their migrationrate is
high.Table 2shows that migration rates decline with duration of marriage
steeplyat first andagainafter 5—9yearsofmarriage.—19—
TABLE1
Men20 to 64 Years Old with Nonfarm Occupations —PercentGeographically





20to 24 years old
Married, wife present 39.8 19.2 8.8
Wife in paid labor force 42.0 19.7 8.5
Wife not in paid labor force 38.0 18.8 9.0
Other marital status 14.9 13.5 8.5
25 to 29 years old
Married, wife present 23.5 12.4 5.8
Wife in paid labor force 27.1 10.8 5.1
Wife not in paid labor force 21.3 13.3 6.3
Other marital status 20.4 13.1 7.4
30 to 34 years old
Married, wife present 14.7 7.8 3.6
Wife in paid labor force 17.0 6.3 2.7
Wife not in paid labor force 13.5 8.5 4.1
Other marital status 20.9 10.0 4.8
35 to 44 years old
Married, wife present 8.9 4.9 2.5
Wife in paid labor force 9.5 3.8 1.8
Wife not in paid labor force8.5 5.7 3.0
Other marital status 17.0 7.2 3,5
45 to 54 years old
Married, wife present 6.2 2.7 1.3
Wife in paid labor force 6.5 3.0 0.8
Wife not in paid labor force5.9 3.3 1.7
Other marital status 14.4 4.9 2.4
55 to 64 years old
Married, wife present 4.6 1.9 0.7
Wife in paid labor force 4.6 1.4 0.3
Wife not in paid labor force4.5 2.2 1.0
Othermaritalstatus 10.7 3.9 0.8
Source: March Current Population Surveys, 1966-1971, averaged.—20—
TABLE2
Mobilityof Men by Marital Status and Duration of Marriage









1 year 29.1 14.4
2 years 19.8 9.4
3—5 years 14.0 7.6
5—9 years 10.1 5.4
10+ years 3.7 1.8
Separated 9.2 5.0
Spouse Absent 21.1 8.6
Widowed 4.0 1.8
Divorced 13.5 5.8
Source: CPR, P—20, No.. 193, Table 5.—21—
Another interesting distinction shown in Table 3isthat between never
married singles(s) andother not married persons. (0).With the exception
ofmen under 25, single men have higher mobility rates than married men,
thoughthemargin is small. Rates of "others" are much higher than those of
married men)3 It seems plausiblethatthe differentdurations of marital
status contribute tothe muchhigher migration propensities of "others" (sepa-
rated,divorced,widowed): Their status is on average about six years
while the duration of singleness is bydefinition(never—married) the longest
of allthe groups includingthose current].ymarried.
A factor which further depresses the rate of singles is that manyof
them(1O—5O% of the single men and3O—10%ofsinglewomen) live in parental
households orwith other close relatives. This is another example of familial
tieswhich deter migration: As shown inTable1, relatives of headsliving
in their household have lower migration rates than heads ofhouseholdswho
are married,wife present. Despite the fact that a smaller proportion of
single women live with parents or relatives, single women migrate less than
single men, andindeedless than married women (Table 3)especiallyat younger
ages. Whether this finding reflects a greater economic dependence of single
women ontheirfamilies cannot be determined from the data.
2. Wife's Employment Status
Conflicting incentives about migration andaboutchoices of destina-
tion aremostlikely to emerge whenbothhusband andwifearejobholders,
especiallywhen wife's job attachment is strong and hercontribution to family
13Theexceptions are widowed persons, but they tend to be much older
than each of the other groups.
l1Becker, Landes, and Michael (1976).TABLE 3 -22
Migration Rates by Age, Sex, Marital Status, 1968—69
Men Women
Marital
Age Status All Lpa All LP
18—24 S 9.6 11.1 8.8 10.3
M 21.7 21.0 20.7 20.9
MLYb 30.4 29.0 36.8 37.7
0 28.9 28.0 21.9 19.9
25—34 S 11.4 10.9 7.5 8.4
M 10.5 10.4 9.1 7.4
0 20.7 19.4 12.4 10.9
35—44 S 5.5 5.4 4.6 3.0
M 5.5 5.5 4.7 3.5
0 14.9 12.1 5.5 4.4
45—64 S 5.0 3.4 2.7 1.5
M 2.9 2.6 2.8 1.7
0 8.1 6.0 3.2 2.6
Source: CPR, P—20, No. 193, Table 7
a1 the labor force
bMarried last yearTABLE 4-23-
MigrationRates by Relation to Household Head, 1970—1971
Household Status Males Females
18—24 5pa 21.9 20.5
Otherhead (OH) - 12.6
Primary individual 24.8 .33.0
and non-relative (PINR)
Relative of head (RH) 6.7 5.7












SourceCPR,P—20, No. 235, Table 6.
aMarri spouse present—2 "-
incomesizeable. This is not to deny the possibility of conflicting non—
pecuniary motives. Unfortunately, an empirical classification of families
by such criteria is not available, while employment status of spouses is
reported in a number of surveys.
All the surveys show higher migration rates of families where the wife
is not employed outside the home than in families where the wife is employed
(Table i). As Long (19714) noted, the evidence confuses cause and effect when
employment status is reported during the survey week, and migration, if any,
during the preceding 12 months. Such findings are partly biased since, of the
women who worked at the place of origin and lost their job throughmigration,15
many did not, or not immediately, regain employment at destination.
The proper comparison is by employment status which precedes migra-
tion. Table 5(topleft panel) shows migration rates of families during a
five—year period following 1965,byage of husband and employment status of
wife. With the exception of the youngest couples, migration rates are lower
in families in which the wives were employed than in families with wives who
did not work in 1965. The least propensity to move is shown in families in
which wives' job attachment is strongest, here (col. 3) identified by the
wifes' employment both in 1965 and 1970.
In young couples (husband's age up to 29 in 1965) where wives worked
in 1965 (but not in 1970), migration rates were not lower than in families
where the wives did not work in 1965. This finding is confirmed in the NLS
sample of young men (next section, Table 7) and can be explained by: (1) in-
vestment aspects of migration: Largest investments with biggest (lifetime)
15lncreasingly states define this phenomenon as job loss, making the
worker eligible for unemployment insurance. The effect is to lower the cost
of migration and increase the incidence and duration of the wife's enemploy—
ment at destination.—25—
TABLE5
(A) Wife's Employment Status andFamilyMigration, 1965—70.
Percent of Migrants by Percent of 1965 Working
Age of Employment Status of Wife Wives Employed in 1970
Husband
E65E6570 N65 Stayers Migrants
20—24 18.816.6 18.8 50.2 41.5
25—29 13.910.7 13.1 57.8 44.0
30—39 7.75.8 9.0 72.5 57.8
40—49 4.1 3.1 5.4 80.1 65.7
50—59 2.5 1.8 3.1 78.0 62.6
Source: 1970 Census of Population, Mobility for States and the Nation.
(B) Labor Force Rates of Women by Migration and Marital Status, 1971.
Marital All Stayers Migrants Interstate
Status
18—24 S .60 .58 .71 .72
M .45 .47 .43 .42
MLY .60 .64 .54 .51
o .58 .61 .49 .50
25—34 S .79 .78 .87 .92
M .40 .40 .33 .30
0 .66 .62 .50 .53
35—44 S .73 .72 .72 .90
M .47 .48 .35 .33
0 .67 .68 .60 .56
45—64 S .70 .70 .70 —
M .44 .64 .32 .24
0 .60 .61 .44 .50
Source: CPS, P—20, No. 235.—26—
payoffsaremade early in the working life. The prospective family gain in
the early career building of the husbandisevidently seen to be larger at this
stagethan inlater mobility, outweighing the possible adverse, butweaker
effects on the market earnings of the wife. (2) Wives' participation in the
labor market is highly transitory at the child—bearing stage. Significantly,
Table 5showsthat in young families where wives had a strong attachment to
their market work (employed both in 1965 and1970), thedeterrent effect on
migration is visible even in the youngest families (compare col. 2 &3):
Evidently, a rise in investment costs ——inthis case, larger foregone earnings
of wives ——doesreduce migration rates. Nevertheless, the deterrent effect
on migration, even of wives who are more strongly attached to thelabor force,
is weaker at younger ages, reflecting the strong incentives to invest in market
careers of husbands.
Table6shows an interaction of wife'semploymentstatus and distance
of migration in their effects on migration rates: Migration rates diminish
with distance, butthey decrease more strongly in families withworking wives
thanin other families. Indeed for the nearest relocations (within counties),
migration rates are higher in two—earner than in one—earnerfamilies. As
Long (l97)putsit:"Having a wife who works may inhibit long—distance
movement, but appears to promote short—distance movement". These findings,
incidentally, hold for employment status reported after (Table1) as well as
before moving (Table 6).
Asearch hypothesis can account for the higher local mobility rate of
two—earner families, and the progressively lower mobility rate of two—earner
compared to one—earner families at increasing distance. Ifsearch costs in-
crease with distance (e.g., when repeated travel is required),the incentives—27—
TABLE6
Married Men20to 59 Years Old in 1965 with Nonfarm Occupations in
1970 -PercentMoving Within Counties and Between States Between
1965and 1970, According to Age and Wife's Employment Status in 1965
Percent of Wives Efliployed in 1970
Percent Percent Movers
Moving Moving Between
Within Between MoversCounties Movers
Counties,States, Non— WithinWithinBetween
1965_7oa1965_70aMoversb Counties a StateStates
Husbands 20 to 24 in 1965
Wifeemployed in 1965 46.6 18.8 54.0 48.2 42.0 41.0
Wife not employed in 1965 42.6 18.8 25.7 31.7 34.0 35.4
Husbands 25 to 29 in 1965
Wife employed in 1965 41.6 13.9 63.6 55.3 46.3 41.7
Wife not employed in 1965 34.9 13.]. 23.6 25.4 23.7 23.4
Husbands 30 to 39 in 1965
Wife employed in 1965 29.4 7.7 78.9 70.8 60.8 54.7
Wife not employed in 1965 23.8 9.0 25.4 26.3 25.4 23.9
Husbands 40 to 49 in 1965
Wife employed in 1965 19.7 4.1 83.7 78.5 69.6 61.7
Wife not employed in 1965 16.6 5.4 21.9 23.6 24.2 22.8
Husbands 50 to 59 in 1965
Wife employed in 1965 16.1 2.5 80.9 76.6 67.9 57.4
Wife not employed in 1965 14.3 3.1 12.9 15.9 16.7 16.8
Source: Bureau of the Census (1973: Table 11).
apercent based on total reporting residence in 1965.
bpersons living in the same house in 1965 and 1970.—28—
tosearch prior to migration are weaker at longer distances for the spouse
with thelesser expected returns from migration. With low G2, migration is
notdeterred. However, the larger wife's earnings, hence potential net losses
(G2 <0)deter more families from both search andmigrationat longer d.is—
tances. At short distances, commutes for search purposes and for job pur-
poses, adjustments in residence for such purposes, as well as visits with
friendsandrelatives are allfeasible. Job search is therefore not restricted
toone earner and greater (residential) mobility follows almost as a matter
16
of arithmetic.
Consistentevidence is provided by findings that in contrast to long
distancemigration which is positively related to education of husband, short
distance (within counties) moves are inversely related to it (Manpower Report,
l97).The converse is true of wives' labor force participation and of their
education. (See Tables 1 and T.) Apparently, where the female to male wage
ratio is higher, migration, if any, is shorter, as the incidence of tied
husbands is greater. Short—distance search is a preferable alternative to
a potentially largelossat longer distances.
3. The Family Context in Multivariate alysis
Some of the well—established findings in empirical migration studies
are: the positive effects of education and the negative effects of family
size,particularly the presence of school—agechildren)7 In studies of
labor force behavior, mothers' labor force rates are lowest when the children,
is not to deny the possible validity of another factor mentioned
by Long (19714), namelythatmany of the wives work in order to upgrade family
housing.
1TSee Long (1972, 1973) andthereferences therein.—29—
TABLE7
Probabilityof Migration in1966—69, Hegressed. on
1966 Origin Variables
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.0056 1.53 .0150 i.6 —.0272 —2.35
—.0001 —2.16 —.0001 —•91 —.0002 —1.65
.0207 .50 .1031i .95 .1610
—.0363 —1.09 —.1013 —1.61 .0090 1.99
—.0907 —2.57 _2.661 —2.83 n.a.
(C)IlLS, YOUNG MEN, AGE 18—28 IN 1971
Migration 1971—73, Variables 1971
.00149 1.25 .0380 3.30 —.0187 —3.11
—.0101 —3.57 —.0181 —2.08 —.0181
—.0065 —1.28 —.0055 —.37 —.0187 —2.37'
.0062 .214 .01467 .66 —.03614 —.93
.0073 .32 —.0121 —.18 .01498 1.142
—.00001 —143 —.00001 —.514 —.0000 —.72
—.01422 —1.11 —.01496 —.140 _.09114 —1.56—30—
areof pre—school age and they increase substantially whenchildren are en-
rolled inschool. Thus, the positive effect of education (or of wagelevel)
of husband onhis migration. reflects not only greater "private" gainsfrom
migration, but also an intra—farnily substitutioneffect. The greater compara-
tive advantage in the husbands' market work leads to lessermarket work of
the wife and, therefore, to fewer obstacles to family migration.Similarly,
the pre—school status of young children signifies not only alesser loca-
tional attachment of the family, but also little labormarket attachment of
the mother, hence again a lesser obstacle to geographicmobility. Moreover,
intertemporal substitution is also at work: Anticipatedlocational attachment
related to schooling of children may well induce a speedupof migration in
youngfamilies.
Obviously,age of parents and of children,education of husband, fer-
tility, andlaborforce behavior of wife areallinterrelated. Whetherand
towhat extent each of these factors affects migrationis a question re-
quiring multi—variate statistical analyses.Several recent studies provide
evidence in theform of multiple regressions or several—waycross—tabulations
of data: On the whole the biases created byleft—out variables tend to be
minor,and most of the variables appear to be relevant.
Thus Long (1972) finds that school—age childrenreduce migratiOn not
merely because their parents areolderthan the parents of pre—schcol children:
At each age (of parents) and at each family size,the effect is pronounced.
Also,given ages of parents and children, numbersof children have a (weak)
negative effect on migration. Similarly, separatedand divorced women migrate
more readily than married women not merely becausethey are less likely to
havechildren: At each ageof mother and number andagesof children, their—31—
migration rates are higher. Based on regressions for NLS women who were 30—
414 years old in1966,Sandell (1976) summarizes the net effects of wife's
employment status in 1967 and of the children's age composition on fainil.y
migration in the subsequent five—year period as follows:






Inregressions of migration probabilities of families in the Michigan
Income Dynamics Sample, Polachekand Horvath (1976) also find separate effects
ofwife's market work, her education, andofthe presence of school agechildren.
Consistentwith ourdiscussion,the stronger the wife's labor force attach-
ment andthemore important herearnings, the greater the negative effects on
fami).y migration. Polachek and Horvathmeasure their variables by wives'
occupation("menial" vs. higher level) and education.As alreadymentioned,
husband'seducation has a positive effect in all studies, and. is not much
• . 18 weakenedby the inclusion of the family variables.
Inour current NBER study19 of work experience as it shapes the life-
time evolution of wages, we find that husband's labor force turnover is posi-
.ve1y associated with labor market activities of the wife. Both in Coleman—
Rossi and in the NLS data for husbands age 145_59, there was a strong positive
l8Higher education of husband indicates greater gains from migration.
Thisappears in the Polachek—Horvath regression where estimated gains from
migrationareused as an independent variable in the migration regression.
Husbands'education, when included together with the gain variable, loses all
significance.
19WorkExperience andLifetime Earnings (Bartel, Borjas, Mincer), in progress.—32—
associationbetween wives' l&Dor force participation as well as wives' educa-
tion andhusbands'quit, but not layoff experience. A somewhat weaker rela-
tion is found also in the youngest NLScohort.This suggests that the wife's
contributionto family income permits greater scope for search activities and
job choices of the husband. Evidently, a strong market position of the wife
simultaneously encourages job mobility of the husband and discourages geo-
graphic mobility of the family.20 This intra—family relation suggests at least
one interesting implication: If migration is, in part, a consequence of job
turnover rather than conversely, the probability of job—related migration
(more precisely, the joint probability of quit and migration) will not show
the deterrent effects of wives' market work as clearly as the (conditional)
probability of migration ()givena quit (Q),sinceP(QIThI) =P(Q)
.
andthe two terms on the right are affected in a contradictory fashion by
wife's employment status.
Table I compares regression effects on joint, conditional probabilities
of migration, and on probabilities of quit of the older (i:LS), younger (CR)
and youngest(ITLS)cohortsof men. Family variables,especiallywives' employ-
ment and education have positive effects on quits of husbands, negative effects
in the conditional regressions for quit—related migration, and weakeffectsin
the regressions of joint probabilities. mongtheyoungest men, wife's work
has no significant effect onmigration,aswealso found in the Census data
(Table 5;Cf.discussion on p. ).Thepresence of school—age children in-
hibits migration in the multiple regressions aswell. Again, familiesof
theyoungest men are exceptions. The family variables have no effect in lay-
offregressions, not shown in the Table.
2OThis may be an additional factor in the greater residential mobility
oftwo—earner families.—33—
A possible explanation of the lay—off case is that unemploymentbrings
a reduction in opportunity costs of migration which outweighs most of the
potential lossin wives'earnings. Unemployment of husbandsmakes "tied
movers"out of some of the workingwives.
Generally, theregressions confirm the previously describedeffects
ofmarital status, of its recency, and of otherfamily variables. It should
be noted, that the smallnumbers of migrants in the sample produce statistics
withlow levelsof significance.
Effectsof Migration on Family Employment Status
Since unemployment reduces opportunity costs of migration, itisnot
surprisingtofind that the migrationrateof the unemployed is higher than
the migration rate of the employed.21 We dofind,however, in both the C—R
andNLSdata that the migration rate of those who quit exceeds the rate of those
laid—off (temporary layoffs excluded). This suggests that some quitsare
motivatedbymigration ——indeed,one half of the quits who migrated acquired
the new job before quitting. Layoffs, however, are not likely to be induced
by migrationopportunities.
Aswewould expect, men who migrate have higher unemployment rates than
non—migrantsboth at origin and atdestination (see Table 8).Inthe NLS
sample, origin unemployment ratesmigrantswhose wives worked (at origin)
were6%pointshigherthan rates of non—migrants, compared to a 2% differen-
tial formigrantswhose wives did not work in the period prior to migration.
Similarly, the average duration of unemployment of stayers was3months,while
unemploymentatorigin of movers with non—working wives was1months andwith
21See,for example, Special Labor Force Report, No. 4,BLS,19614.TABLE 8
— 3'—
(A) 1970 Unemployment Rates by Mobility in 1965—1970
Men16+ 3.5 4,5
Men35—44 2.0 3.0 2.6 3.3
Women 16+ 4.1 5.8 6.0 7.1
Women 35—44 3.5 4.8 5.2 6.2
Source: 1970 Census, Mobility for States and the Nation, Table 6.




Stayers 8.7 4.7 4.4
Movers 5.8 7.5 8.3
Stayers 6.5 4.3 3.7
(C) Employment Status of Movers in Stayers in 1963, by Employment Status in 1962,
Male Family Heads, Age 25—64
Employment Status in 1963 (Destination)
1962 (Origin)
Status
Employed Unemployed Not in Labor Force
Movers 91.3 5.7 3.0
Stayers 96.3 2.6 1.1
Movers 78.5 18.2 3.3
Stayers 57.8 36.8 5.4
Not in Movers 67.6 8.7 23.7
Labor Force Stayers 20.9 5.2 73.9
Source for (B) and (C): Geographic Molility and Employment Status, March 1962-March 1963,
BLS, Special Labor Force Report, No. 44, 1964.
Same Same Same Different









workingwives 5months:It takes a greater amountofunemployment andalonger
local searchbefore"tied" husbandsare inducedto move. This is an interesting
exampleofthe effect of dual job families on the volume of unemployment
22
While family ties tend to lengthen the unemploymentofhusbands prior
to migration, they create unemployment among wives at destination. As shown
in Table 8, migrating husbandsalsohave higher unemployment rates than others
at destination, but their unemployment is reduced relative to what it was at
origin:23this, after all, was thepurpose of migration. In contrast, wives
ofmigrants have unemployment ratesat origin that areno greater than those
ofwives ofstayers, but the rate is much higher at destination (Table 8).
Reflectingthe lesser effect on family income, wife's search for a new job at
destination is either less intensive prior to migration or postponed until
after migration.
The unemployment of women migrants at destination is either a result
of job loss at origin, or of labor force entry at destination by women who
did not work in the period prior to migration. This does not mean that,
in sum, more women migrants are in the labor force at destination than at
origin. The opposite is true: The lower panel of Table 5showedthat labor
force rates of wives who migrated are smaller than the labor force rates of
stayers within 12 months after migration. While the effects are strongest
immediately after migration, they last at least several years: It wasshown
in Table 5(upperright panel) that only !o%ofthe younger migrant wives
whoworked at origin (in1965) were employed at destination (in 1970),compared
standardexample is the "added worker effect", where unemployment
of husbands induces labor force entry of wives, which augments the unemploy-
ment of women.
23Table8,panel (c).—36—
to 50% of stayers who continued to work. For older wives the percentages who
continued to work were 65% for migrants and 80% for stayers.
It wasnotedpreviously that migration rates of two—earner families
diminish with distance more rapidly than in single earner families. Employ-
mentrates ofwivesdiminish with distance as well(see Tables 5 and6).They
diminishnot onlybecausefewer families with working wives move longer dis-
tances: As Table6shows, employment rates of wives who worked in 1965 de-
clinedformovers much more thanforstayers, andfor long—distance (inter-
state) movers most. In contrast, roughly the same proportion (about 25%)
of wives who were not employed in 1965workedin1970,regardless ofmigra-
tion status and location.
It was argued before that incentives for search prior to migration
are weaker for tied movers and prior search is costlier the more distant the
destination. And search at the unfamiliar destination can be prolonged and
unsuccessful. Consequently, the lesser search prior to migration is one pos-
sible explanation of the adverse effect of distance on wives' employment.
In addition, husbands' gains from migration increase with distance, and both
such gains and the probability of migrating long distances increases with
the education of the husband. Therefore, the intra—family income and sub-
stitution effects induce levels of wives' labor supply inverse to distance
and make decreases in their labor supply a positive function of distance.
Both unemployment and labor force withdrawal are results of tied
migration of working wives. If employment and earning opportunities turn out
to be meager or inferior at destination, withdrawal from the labor force is
a likely possibility. Reduction in wives' market labor supply following migra-
tion isinducednot only by the decrease in the wife's (expected) wagerela-
tive tothat of the husband's, but also by an increased family demand for—3T—
non—marketactivity necessitated by setting up a new household in a new environ-
ment. The last factor may only temporarily remove women from the labor force.
In sum, migration results in both temporary interruptions andlong—termwith-
drawals from work.
The contrast between job motivated and tied migration is seen not only
in the comparison of effects on work experience of migrating spouses, but
alsointhe comparison of single with married women migrants. As Table 5,
panelB indicates, in contrast to married women, single women migrantshave
higherlabor force rates at destination than at origin. Another vivid illus-
tration of family ties in migration is provided by the Polachek and Horvath
study of the Income Dynamics data: They find that families with husbands
receiving high wages move toward areas with fewer women in the labor force,
while families in which the wife has ahigh wa€e tend to move towardareas
withbetteropportunities for women, as measured by a higher percentage of
womenin the labor force and by lower unemployment rates.Thisis evidence
that the effect of existing family ties on work experience following aigra—
tionis symmetrical for each of the sexes. Itis the incidence and magnitude
ofties, rather than their effects that differs among the sexes.
Notonly tied movers but also tied stayers experience a redu.ction in
the market earnings potential. By definition, "tied" stayers fail to exploit
potential gains from labor mobility. The confinement of job mobility to the
local labor market, often at short distances, reduces the scope for job change
and the quality of the job match. Ifso,we may expect both a lesser propensity
to change jobs on the part of working wives, as wellasa greater vulnerability
to layoff. Given a job loss, the lesser scope for search results in reduced
wage aspirations, more unemployment, and labor force withdrawals. Although
the implied duration of unemployment can be shorter because of reduced acceptance—38—
wages and/orlabor force withdrawals, its incidence is likely to be
greater.
In two studies of job mobility in 1955 and 1961, the Current Popula—
tioriSurvey found that the proportion of job changers among working women was
20—30%smaller than among men. But, since women work almost 20%fewer weeks
duringthe year, the proportion of job changers does not appearto be dif-
ferent among the sexes per unit oftime. Still, the conclusion that women's
(purposive)job mobility is smaller than men's is correct: Women's job tenure
is on average half the length of men's tenure. In view of the just quoted
statistics on job change, this reduction in tenure is due entirely to labor
force withdrawals. As is well known, job turnover declines rapidly with tenure.
Consequently, if frequency of job change of women were the same as that of
men at each level of tenure, women would be observed to have a larger overall
frequency of job change per unit of time since their tenure is shorter. Evi-
dently, their job mobility is lower than that of men at comparable levels of
tenure. This inference is confirmed in Table 9: For each level of tenure,
except the earliest, the job change rate of women (col. 14)isless than the
rate of men (col. 5), even though the men are about 10 years older. Total
separation rates of men (not shown here) are only slightly larger than in
ccl. 5. Total turnover among women is twice as high as job mobility in the
first 2 years of tenure, and the proportional excess increases with level of
tenure (compare col. 1 with 1). The difference is, of course, due to labor
force withdrawals. Note that their rate (col. 2) is largely unrelated to tenure,
in contrast to job mobility rates, which decline. Note also that reported
"quits for family reasons", an independent statistic, is very close to the
estimate of labor force withdrawals. The former does, of course, imply the—39.-
TABLE 9
Labor Turnover, Job Mobility and LaborForceWithdrawalin1969—1971,
of Married Women, Age351+9,by Level of Tenure in 1969 NLS Samples
JobMobility
Total Labor ForceQuit for Job Ratea of Men
Years ofSeparation Withdrawal FamilyMobility Age 145_590
Tenure Rate Rate Reasons Rate NLS Sale
(i) (2) (3) (l)—(2) (5)
0—2 1+6.9 20.6 18.0 26.3 25.1
2—1+ 15.8 10.1+ 7.6 5.14 17.5
11+.9 7.8 6.7 7.1 11.0
6—8 18.5 9.9 8.8 8.6 12.1+
8—10 13.1+ 9.0 6.7 6.3
10—12 15.7 11.8 13.7 3.9 7.0
12—11+ 16.1+ 12.5 12.2 3.9 3.8
il+—i8 11.8 9.6 9.3 2.2
18+ 12.8 11.2 9.0 1.6 3.8
aAverage of periods 1967—1969 and 1969—1971.
bAgin 1966.—140—
latter, thoughnotalways ——forexample, migration need not imply a withdrawal
fromthe labor force, though it very frequently does.
Census tabulations of unemployment by source suggest that most of the
excess of female over male unemployment is due to the unemployment of labor
force entrants, andespeciallyof re—entrants. However, among the unemployed
who worked prior to unemployment, job leavers represent about one—third of all
unemployed women (over 20 years of age), while they amount to only one—sixth
to one—fifth of the comparable category of unemployed men: .Iost likely, this
is a reflection of the family, rather than of job motivated quits. Such
"exogenous" quits of women (or men) tend to involve unemployment to a larger
degree than job—motivated quits, which occur usually after workers have lined
up the next job.
5. Gainsand Losses in Earnings
As has been documented in many studies (Greenwood, 1975),geograhic
migration usually increases earnings of men. However, effects on employment
of wives suggest that earnings of wives may suffer. Indeed, Galloway (1963)
was the first to find that interregional migration was associated with a de-
crease in the earnings of women (he did not distinguish marital status).
In the N Report (1976), Sandell finds that between 1967 and 1911,
incomesof migrant husbands increased by $l,l7 per year more than incomes of
nonmigrant husbands, while incomes of migrant families increased by$952
peryear. The difference (—$222)represents the average loss of wives. The
wives' income loss is partly a result of a reduction in labor supply and partly
a reflection of lesser wage growth of tied migrants. Adverse effects were also
foundbothin the growth of annual earnings as well as in wagerates ofmigrant wives by Polachek and Horvath (1976)inthe Michigan Income Dynamics
Panel for 1968—1969 migrants.
Losses of migrant wives' earnings (relative to earnings of non-migrant
wives) diminish with the passage of time, as do the differences in weeks
worked, as Sandell reports. Initial uninformed search and family demands
connected with setting up a new household are temporary and account for the
initially strongest declines in employment and. earnings of wives. A conclu-
sion for the study of gains from migration is that, although conceptually less
appropriate,they arediscernable in earnings of husbands more quickly (though
notimmediately after migration) than in familyincomes.
While migration of tied wives interrupts their work experience and
reduces their wage progress, gainsfrommigration are larger for marriedthan
for other men, according to regressions using the various panel data (C—R,
NLS, and. MID). The gains are larger especially in families with "tied" wives:
Thus Ann Bartel (1975) finds inthe Coleman—Rossi data that where wives worked
atorigin (but not at destination) husbands received the largest gains ($122
per month). Gains weremuchsmaller ($51 per month) where wives did not work
at origin (but did at destination). Gains of husbands were average when wives
had unchanged employment status. Similarly, in the NLS sample men in their
twenties whose wives had large earnings receive larger wage gains than other
migrating husbands ofwives who worked at origin.
The positive effects of marital status on migration gainsof men,
especiallyof husbandsof working women (prior to migration) reflect family
ties:Potential losses of wives raise the acceptance wage of migrating hus-
bands. Bothresults follow: the probability of migration diminishes and the
"private" gain of the purposive job seeker increases.—
Wemay conclude that the intra—family trade—off in gains and losses
from migration involves mutual causality: Gains of husbands induce a reduction
in labor supply and earnings losses of wives, while the potential losses of
wives' migration reduces migration but increases the gains of husbands in
families which move.
6. Migration,Family Stability and Trends
The empirical evidence described thus far reflects the internalization
of family ties which, in the context of migration, can be viewed as an externality
tothe family member in'his (her) "private" capacity. Aswe argued in the
theoreticaldiscussion, conflicting "private" locational incentives cannot
always bereconciled, and prospective or actual migration leads to family dis-
solution. Conversely, when families disintegrate for whatever reason, loca-
tional equilibrium changes for many of the separated and divorced persons and
migration follows.
We have seen the stronger migration propensities of divorced and separated
persons compared to others in some of the data citedbefore. Evidence on
temporal sequences which would reflect migration—caused family breakup is
difficult to come by. We are able to get some inferences only from one data
set: The Coleman—Rossi panel provides chronological data on labor mobility
and on family formation and dissolution over a period averaging 15 years ——
fromcompletion of high school to the mid—thirties of a sample of about 1,000
men. In this sample:
(1) Less than 2 of the marriages dissolved by separation or
divorce in an average year. However, in a 12—month period
bracketinga geographic move (inter—state) of the respondent
(husband),5%ofthe families broke up.(2) About 8%ofthe married men moved to another county in a
random year, but 19% moved in years bracketing marital breakup.
Although each ofthecomparison reflect causality running in either direction,
thefirst more nearly shows the effect of mobility on faini3.y integrity, while
the second is more likely to convey the effect of marital breakup in creating
a locational disequilibrium, which underlies the highmobilityrates of separated
anddivorcedpersons.
By increasing the incidence of tied spouses, trends toward equaliza-
tionof labor market experience of men andwomen maycontribut to a decrease
inmigration rates of married couples, as well as to an increase in marital
instability of migrants as wellas of stayers.2 However, increasesin marital
instability,whatever their source, stimulate migration of persons, and. trends
ofdivorce andseparationarestronglyupward.
It appears, on balance, that rates of migration inthe U.S. have been
relatively stable since World War II, with a slight decline noticeable since
1960. Thustotalresidential moves declined from 20.1% to 17.7%between1960
and 1975.Inthe five year period 1970—1975, intercounty moves declined
from ll.i. to 10.8% and interstate moves from 3. to 3.0% (CPR, 1976).
Without complete multivariate analysis, it is difficult to tell how much
changesinthe family contributed to the trends. Obviously, several other
factors worked in conflicting directions: Growing education of husbands should
have increased migration, but the growing education of wives mayhavepro-
duced theopposite effect. Upward trends are also predicted by declining family
2lThe effect of the intra—fainily relative earnings on familystability
is not restricted to episodes of migration. Cf. Becker (1973) and Santos
(1975)for analysis anddocumentation.14
size, but the consequent agingofthe population would work in the opposite
direction. Improved transportation andcommunicationmay reduce costs of
migrating, but mayalsoreduce incentives to do so by substituting commuting
for migration.145_
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The subject of this paper was the exploration of the effects of family
ties on migration, of the effects of migration decisions in the presence of
such ties on employment andearningsof familymembers,andonfamilystability.
Ties aredefinedonlyinrelation to migration decisions: In the case of a
single (aggregated) destination, ties exist when individual ("private") gains
of familymembersdiffer in sign. The tied. person is one whose gain(orloss)
issmaller in absolute value. In the more general case of several potential
destinations, ties exist so long as the gain of at least one spouse in the
family's optimal location is less than his or her "private" maximum. In this
case both spouses can be "tied", although the discrepancy from the private
optimum is likely to be larger for the spouse with the smaller gain. Indeed,
the discrepancy is a measure of the magnitude of the tie. It is a measure
of the negative externality which the decision to move (or to stay) imposes
on the family members in their individual capacities.
Theseexternalities areusually,but not always, internalized by the
family.They areabsorbedwithout undermining familyintegrity so long as
the sum of the ties is less than the gains from marriage. Otherwise, the
family dissolves, and at least one person moves. The theorem that families
move whenever family gain is positive and stay when it is negative must,
therefore, be amended: The sign of the family gain is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition, for the decisions to move or not to move as a family.
(1) The presence of family ties deters migration of families, even though
It creates "tied" movers as well. Since gains or losses from migration—
areincreased by job mobility, two-earner families are more likely to
bedeterredthansingle-earnerfamilies. Single earners in husband-
wife families are almost always men, so it is familieswith working
wiveswhose migration is most likely to be inhibited.
piricalevidence on the effects of marital status confirms these
propositions: Marriedpersonsare less likely to move thansingles,
and the mobility of separated anddivorcedparents ("others") is by
farthehighest. The mobility of singles is dampened by the fact that
manyofthem are "tied members of households headed by parents or other
close relatives. In contrast, the mobility of "ot'ers" is auiented
by their relatively recent change of marital status whichcreatesa
change of locational equilibrium. The same effect, of course,holds
fornewly married couples.
Evidence on lesser migration rates of families with working wives
isebundant. The deterrenteffects are stronger when wife's attachment
ismore permanent, and when she is more educated. In contrast,when
families are classified by education of husband, they are more likely
to move: Educated husbands' contribution to family income is larger
andtheir gain from migration is morelikely to outweigh their wifes'
losses.
Thedeterrent effect of wife's employment and of her education
increases with distance, while husband's education is positively re-
lated to the distance of migration. At shorter distances (intra—
countymoves), wives earnings actually permit more inensive search
activities of husbands. Indeed, search of both spouses is not inhibited,
since residential changes or commutes can accommodate job changes of_147_
each.Accordingto ouranalysis,where the female to maleearnings
ratio is higher, the incidence of immobilized husbandsincreases.
Consequently, local mobilityincreases relative to long—distance migra-
tion.
Since earnings of wives permit a greater scope for purposive
search of husbands, working wives increase the probability of husbands'
job change(byquit). Job changers are more likely to migrate than
those who do not quit; thus wives' work exerts indirectly a positive
effect on migration, as well as the negative effect already described.
The deterrent effect of wives' employment is, therefore, less clearly
observed in the unconditional than in the conditional (or quit) probability
offamilymigration.
(2) Migration tends to reduce the unemployment of men and to increase the
unemployment of women, since women tend to be tied movers. But to the
extent that men are tied, unemployed men with working wives tend to
search longer at origin than unemployed husbands of non—working wives,
even if they eventually migrate. Migrating wives experience increases
in unemployment, reductions in employment, and labor force withdrawals
at destination, and these effects increase with distance. The reasons,
some of which have already been stated are: Postponement of job search
until after the move, change in intra—family income and substitution
variables, and at least temporary increasesin familydemand for house-
holdactivities. Not only tied movers, but also tied stayers experience
adverse effects in the labor market: The restrictionof job mobility
toshort distances reduces the scope of job search and opportunities— I8—
foradvancement and increases the probability of job mismatch,
unemployment and labor force withdrawal.
Wemay conclude that the growth of two—earner fathlies increases
unemrloyment of both sexes, but primarily of women. By interrupting
thecontinuity of women's work, tied migrationleads to slower growth
ofwages over the life cycle. Theadverse effect on wage growth can occur
evenwithout discontinuity of employment since the mere interruption
of job tendure reduces incentives of worker andemployers for job—
srecific investments. Tied migration rants next to child—rearing as
an imn.ortant danpening influence in the life—cycle wage evolution of
(3)By irinosing "orivate'T negative externalities on at least one of the
souses, family location decisions cn be a challenge to f_'tily
integrity. Usually, these externalities areinternalized bythe fsniiy.
However, when the externality (T)exceedsthe gain from marriage (H)
the marriage dissolves. The likelihood of a hreakmo occasioned by
location decisions is increased when marital stability is uncertain
for other reasons: If pisthe probability of preserving the marriage
(regardless of location), then the expected gain from marriag.e is rU,
and thecondition for breakup isT>pH.Thus,the lessstablethe
marriagethe greater its vulnerability to tied migration decisions.
Tnen anunstablemarriage dissolves, each of the spouses follows
hisor her (old or new) privateoptimal location. Thus, not only do
migrationincentives contribute toinstability, but instability ——
whateverits source ——increasesmigration. Theincreasing equalization— 19_
oflabormarketattachments of men andwomen createsanincrease
inmigration ties, thereby deterring migration as well as con-
tributing to maritalinstability.At the same time, the dramatic
recent trend.s in maritalinstabilitystimulate migration of
separated persons. The net effect onmigrationrates is unclear,
butthe effects on marital instability are reinforcing. In turn,
feedbacks on women's labor supply reinforce the upward trends in
their market employment.—
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